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In this paper we develop a model of the exchange rate. The existence of
transactions costs introduces an important non-linearity. Agents have different
beliefs about the future exchange rate. We show that this simple model creates
great complexity in the market which is characterised by the fact that the
exchange rate is disconnected from its fundamental most of the time. Periods of
tranquility and turbulence alternate in unpredictable manner. Finally we show that
this model mimicks most of the empirical puzzles uncovered in the literature.













Belgium1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The link between exchange rate behaviour and economic fundamentals has been
one of the most challenging and controversial issues in the economic profession
since the inﬂuential paper by Meese and Rogoﬀ (1983). Empirical analysis has
uncovered a number of facts that the theory has hardly succeeded in accounting
for. First, exchange rate movements appear to be unrelated to changes in the
economic fundamentals. Second, the volatility of exchange rate returns exceeds
by far the volatility of fundamentals. Third, the distribution of exchange rate
returns exhibits excess kurtosis or fat tails. Fourth, exchange rates returns are
well described by a GARCH process. Standard macroeconomic models cannot
explain these empirical facts in a satisfactory way (see, for example, Rogoﬀ
(1996)).
In the attempt to solve these puzzles two new approaches have recently been
adopted: one focuses on the role of transactions costs; the other on the role of
heterogeneous agents. Although these approaches have been usually pursued
independently from each other, we believe that a joint modelling of transac-
tion costs and heterogeneous agents is required for a better understanding of
exchange rate dynamics.
This paper presents a simple model of the exchange rate that incorporates
transaction costs as a source of non-linearity and heterogeneous agents. Agents
diﬀer in their use of forecasting rules. They can choose to use either a funda-
mentalist or a chartist rule. Under the former rule agents expect the exchange
rate to return to its fundamental value in the future. Under the latter rule
agents extrapolate past exchange rate values into the future. In each period the
fraction of agents that choose to use either one or the other rule depends on the
risk-adjusted relative proﬁtability of the two forecasting rules.
The model is solved using simulation techniques, as the non-linearity does
not allow a simple analytical solution. We ﬁrst analyse the determinist ver-
sion of the model. We then examine a version of the model that includes a
stochastic noise, and thus makes the model more realistic. This simple model
is capable of creating a remarkably complex dynamics. We ﬁnd sensitivity to
initial conditions, which implies that a small disturbance can drive the exchange
rate on a diﬀerent path. Second, the eﬀect of a permanent shock in the fun-
damental exchange rate has a complex structure that might even be chaotic.
This implies that the eﬀect of a permanent shock in the fundamentals is largely
unpredictable, i.e. one cannot forecast how the shock will aﬀect the exchange
rate in any particular point of time. However, one can predict the average ef-
fect. We also ﬁnd that the eﬀect of such a shock depends on the exact timing
of its occurrence. Thus, history matters. The market has a memory. This con-
trasts with the prevailing exchange rate models based on the eﬃcient market
and rational expectations assumptions that tend to be a-historical.
Next, we investigate the empirical relevance of the model. We analyse to
what extent our model is capable of reproducing the exchange rate puzzles that
we observe in reality. The ﬁrst puzzle we analyse is the ”disconnect puzzle”, i.e.,
exchange rate movements are disconnected, most of the time, from the move-
2ments of the underlying fundamental variables. In our model ”disconnection”
is a natural outcome of the complex dynamics produced by the interactions
between agents using diﬀerent pieces of information. Second we investigate the
“excess volatility puzzle”, i.e. exchange rate returns volatility exceeds by far
the volatility of the underlying fundamentals. Our model mimicks this feature.
A third puzzle relates to the presence of fat tails and excess kurtosis in the
exchange rate returns distribution. We ﬁnd that our results are consistent with
such an empirical regularity. Our model produces a complex dynamics of the
exchange rate with intermittency of periods of high and low turbulence. This
alternation of periods of tranquility and turbulence is itself unpredictable. A
fourth empirical regularity concerns the volatility clustering and persistence of
exchange rate returns. We ﬁnd GARCH eﬀects in the simulated exchange rate
returns that come close to the GARCH eﬀects observed in the real life exchange
rate returns. Fifth, the empirical evidence suggests that in environments with
high variance of the fundamentals the link between exchange rate changes and
its fundamentals (e.g. inﬂation rates) is tighter than in low variance environ-
ments. We also obtain such a result in our model. This also implies that in
high variance environments predicting exchange rate changes using fundamental
information should be easier than in low variance environments.
Finally, we analyse the internal consistency of the model by investigating
under which the conditions "chartism" can survive in our model.
2 The model
In this section we develop a simple non-linear model of the exchange rate . We
assume agents of diﬀerent types i depending on their beliefs about the future
exchange rate. Each agent can invest in two assets, a domestic and a foreign









t+1 is the wealth of agent of type i at time t+1, Et.is the expecta-
tion operator, µ is the coeﬃcient of risk aversion and V i(Wi
t+1) represents the










where r and r∗ are respectively the domestic and the foreign interest rates, st+1
i st h ee x c h a n g er a t ea tt i m et + 1 ,di,t represents the holdings of the foreign
assets by agent of type i at time t. Thus, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side
of 2 represents the value of the foreign portfolio in domestic currency at time
t+1 while the second term represents the value of the domestic portfolio at time
t+1.
Substituiting equation 2 in 1 and maximising the utility with respect to di,t
allows us to derive the optimal holding of foreign assets by agents of type i :
3di,t =
(1 + r∗)Ei








ni,tdi,t = Dt (4)
where ni,t i st h en u m b e ro fa g e n t so ft y p ei .
Market equilibrium implies that the market demand is equal to the market
supply Xtwhich we assume to be exogenous1.T h u s ,
Xt = Dt (5)
Substituting the optimal holdings into the market demand and then into the


























In order to model the expectations formation we assume that there are two types

































Thus the exchange rate is determined by the expectations of fundamentalists
and chartists about the future exchange rate. These forecasts are weighted by
their respective variances.
We now specify how fundamentalists and chartists.form their expectations
of the future exchange rate. In a second step we will specify how they take into
account the risk as measured by the variances.
The fundamentalists base their forecast on a comparison between the market
and the fundamental exchange rate, i.e. they forecast the market rate to return
to the fundamental rate in the future. In this sense they use a negative feedback
rule that introduces a mean reverting dynamics in the exchange rate . The speed
with which the market exchange rate returns to the fundamental is assumed to
1The market supply is determined by the net current account and by the sales or purchases
of foreign exchange of the central bank. We assume both to be exogenous. In an extension of
this paper we intend to endogenise the market supply.
4be determined by the speed of adjustment in the goods market. Thus, the
forecasting rule for the fundamentalists is :
E
f
t (∆st+1)=−ψ (st − s∗
t) (8)
where s∗
t is the fundamental exchange rate at time t , which is assumed
to follow a random walk.
The parameter ψ is determined by the speed of adjustment in the goods
market. There is a large body of empirical evidence indicating that the speed
of adjustment in the goods market follows a non-linear dynamics, i.e. the speed
with which prices adjust towards equilibrium depends positively on the size of
the deviation of the exchange rate from its fundamental value ( misalignment) (
Kilian and Taylor(2001), Taylor, Peel and Sarno(2001), Nobay and Peel (1997)).
We will assume that the fundamentalists take into account this non-linear ad-
justment process in making their forecasts. We specify ψ as follows:
ψ = θ | st − s∗
t | (9)
The economics behind this non-linear speciﬁcation is that in order to proﬁt
from arbitrage opportunities in the goods market, some ﬁxed investment must
be made, e.g. trucks must be bought, planes be chartered, etc. These invest-
ments become proﬁtable with suﬃciently large deviations from the fundamental
exchange rate. Note that we do not model the goods market explicitly but we
assume that in order to form their expectations about the exchange rate, the
fundamentalists take into account the dynamics of the goods market and the
speed of adjustment of goods prices.
T h ec h a r t i s t sf o r e c a s tt h ef u t u r ee x c h a n g er a t eb ye x t r a p o l a t i n gp a s te x -






Thus, the chartists compute a moving avrage of the past exchange rate changes
and they extrapolate this into the future exchange rate change. The degree
of extrapolation is given by the parameter β. Note that in contrast to the
fundamentalists they do not take into account information concerning the fun-
damental exchange rate. In this sense they can be considered to be pure noise
traders .In a way this chartist rule can also be seen as reﬂecting herding behav-
iour, i.e. chartists do not take fundamental information into account because
they feel to uncertain about their meaning, but they closely watch the move-
ments of the exchange rate as a way to detect ”market sentiments”. If the latter
are positive, they buy; if they are negative, they sell.
Our choice to give a prominent role to chartists’ rules of forecasting is based
on empirical evidence. The evidence that Chartism is used widely to make fore-
casts is overwhelming (see Cheung and Chinn(1989), Taylor and Allen(1992)).
It remains important, however, to check if the model is internally consistent. In
particular, the chartists’ forecasting rule must be shown to be proﬁtable within
5the conﬁnes of the model. If these rules turn out to be unproﬁtable, they will
n o tc o n t i n u et ob eu s e d . W er e t u r nt ot h i si s s u ew h e nw el e tt h en u m b e ro f
chartists be determined by the proﬁtability of the chartists’ forecasting rule.
We now analyse how fundamentalists and chartists evaluate the risk. The
latter is measured by the variance terms in equation 7, which we deﬁne as the
weighted average of the squared (one period ahead) forecasting errors made by







t−k (st−k+1) − st−k+1
¤2
(11)
where γk are geometrically declining weights.
However fundamentalists and chartists perceive the risk in a diﬀerent way.
In particular the fundamentalists are assumed to take into account the deviation
of the exchange rate from the fundamental in addition to the forecasting error.
We will call the deviation of the market exchange rate from its fundamental,




















The logic behind this speciﬁcation is that the fundamentalists consider the
fundamental exchange rate as a benchmark. The larger is the misalignment the
less the fundamentalists will attach importance to the short term volatility as
measured by the one-period ahead forecasting error. Put diﬀerently, the larger
i st h ed e v i a t i o no ft h ee x c h a n g er a t ef r o mi t sf u n d a m e n t a l ,t h es m a l l e ri st h er i s k
of using a fundamentalist forecasting rule, given the past (short-term) forecast
errors made by the fundamentalsits. In contrast the chartists do not take into
account the misalignment.
We now specify the dynamics that governs the number of chartists and
fundamentalists, namely nct and nft. In order to do so, we describe how the
















where nc,t and nf,t are the number of chartists and fundamentalists in period
t; p
cf
t represents the probability of a chartist to become a fundamentalist in
period t, and p
fc
t is the probability of a fundamentalist to become a chartist in
period t.
These probabilities are assumed to be a function of the relative utilities of
chartism and fundamentalism. These utilities depend on the proﬁtability of the














where Uc,t−1 and Uf,t−1 are the utility functions of the chartists and funda-
mentalists in period t-1. These probabilities of switching can be interpreted as
follows. When the utility associated with using chartist information increases
relative to the utility of using fundamentalist information the agents tend to
switch from fundamentalism to chartism and vice versa. Taking into account
the speciﬁcation of the utility function (equation 1), we can rewrite equations





































Thus, the probability of switching depends on the relative proﬁts adjusted for
t h er i s k .W h e nt h er i s ka d j u s t e dp r o ﬁts of chartist rules increase relative to the
risk adjusted proﬁts of fundamentalist rules, the probability of switching from
fundamentalism to chartism increases, and vice versa. Agents make a proﬁt
when they correctly forecast the direction of the exchange rate movements.
They make a loss if they wrongly predict the direction of its movements. The
proﬁt (the loss) they make equals the one-period return of investing $1. The
parameter ς measures the sensitivity of the probability of switching with respect
to the relative proﬁts adjusted for the risk . Note also that 0 <ς<1.
3 The model with transactions costs
There is an increasing body of theoretical literature stressing the importance
of transactions costs as a source of non-linearity in the determination of the
exchange rate (Dumas(1992), Sercu, Uppal and Van Hulle(1995), Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ(2000)). The importance of transaction costs has also been conﬁrmed em-
pirically (Taylor, Peel, and Sarno(2001), Kilian and Taylor(2001)). Therefore,
we will develop a version of the previous model in which the transaction costs
play a role.
We take the view that if transaction costs exist, the fundamentalists take this
information into account. Therefore, if the exchange rate is within the trans-
action costs band the fundamentalists behave diﬀerently than if the exchange
rate moves outside the transaction costs band.
7Consider the ﬁrst case, when the exchange rate deviations from the funda-
mental value are smaller than the transaction costs. In this case the fundamen-
talists know that arbitrage in the goods market does not apply. As a result,
they expect the changes in the exchange rate to follow a white noise process.
The best they can do is to forecast no change. More formally,
·when | st − s∗
t |<C ,t h e n E
f
t (∆st+1)=0 .
In the second case, when the exchange rate deviation from its fundamental
value is larger than the transaction costs C (assumed to be of the ’iceberg’ type),
then the fundamentalists follow the same forecasting rule as in equation 8. More
formally,
when | st − s∗
t |>C holds, then equation 8 applies.
This formulation implies that when the exchange rate moves outside the
transaction costs band, market ineﬃciencies other than transaction costs con-
tinue to play a role. As a result, these ineﬃciencies prevent the exchange rate
from adjusting instantaneously. In our model these ineﬃciencies are captured
by the fact that the speed of adjustment in the goods market is not inﬁnite
(equation 9).
4 Solution of the model
In this section we investigate the properties of the solution of the model. We ﬁrst
study its deterministic solution. This will allow us to analyse the characteristics
of the solution that are not clouded by exogenous noise. We use simulation
techniques since the non-linearities do not allow for a simple analytical solution.
We select ” reasonable” values of the parameters, i.e. those that come close
to empirically observed values. We will, however, analyse how sensitive the
solution is to diﬀerent sets of parameter values.
We ﬁrst concentrate on the ﬁxed point solutions of the model. We ﬁnd that
for a relatively wide range of parameters the solution converges to a ﬁxed point
(a ﬁxed-point attractor). However, there are many such ﬁxed points (attrac-
tors) to which the solution converges depending on the initial conditions.. We
illustrate this feature in ﬁgures 1 and 2 where we plot the ﬁxed point solutions
(attractors) as a function of the diﬀerent initial conditions, for two diﬀerent
parameter conﬁgurations. On the horizontal axis we set out the diﬀerent initial
conditions. These are initial shocks to the deterministic system. The vertical
axis shows the solutions corresponding to these diﬀerent initial conditions. Fig-
ure 1 shows the ﬁxed point solutions when the speed of adjustment in the goods
market is fast (0.2), ﬁgure 2 shows the same for slow speeds of adjustment in the
goods market (0.05). Note the complex pattern of these ﬁxed point solutions,
with many discontinuities. This has the implication that a small change in the
initial condition can have a large eﬀect on the solution This feature lies at the
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heart of some of the results that are obtained with this model relating to the
unpredictability of the eﬀect of shocks in exogenous variables. We return to this
phenomenon in section 6.
It should also be noted that the ﬁxed-point attractors lie within the trans-
action costs band. The intuition is that any ﬁxed-point solution outside the
transaction costs band would create an inconsistency, which can be described
as follows. Outside the transaction costs band the fundamentalists’ behaviour
leads to a mean reverting process of the exchange rate, moving the latter to-
wards the transaction costs band. Thus, if a ﬁxed point solution were observed
outside the transactions cost band, this would mean that the fundamentalists
would fail to move the exchange rate towards the band. Once inside the band,
the fundamentalists’ dynamics disappears. The only dynamics then comes from
t h ec h a r t i s t sw h od r i v et h ee x c h a n g er a t et os o m ea t t r a c t o rw i t h i nt h eb a n d .
The exact position of this attractor depends on the entry point of the exchange
rate in the transactions cost band, and this depends on the initial shock.
It is also interesting to point out the existence of critical points. These are
often obtained close to the limit of the transactions cost band. A continuous line
is then broken into a cluster of points. These have a fractal nature, in that they
have an inﬁnite self-replicating characterisitics. We explore this characteristic
further in appendix 1.
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5 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we perform a sensitivity analysis. We do this by showing diagrams
that relate the solutions to diﬀerent values of important parameters of the model.
We concentrate on the extrapolation parameter used by the chartists, as this
turns out to be a crucial parameter determining the nature of the solutions2.
Figures 3 and 4 show examples of such diagrams. They are analogous to so-
called bifurcation diagrams. On the vertical axis we set out diﬀerent values of
the extrapolation parameter. On the vertical axis we show the solutions for the
exchange rate. This is the exchange rate obtained after 1000 periods, given
an initial shock. The two diagrams were constructed for two diﬀerent initial
shocks. We observe the following. For values of β ≤ 0.8 we obtain a continuous
line. This means that there is a unique ﬁxed point solution for each value of
β.When β is approximately 0.8 we have a critical point where the continuous
line breaks into a fractal pattern. We stil have ﬁxed point solutions, though.
The continuous line, however, is fractur e di ns u c haw a yt h a tf o re a c hv a l u eo fβ
only one solution is found. We show a blow-up of the region around this critical
point in appendix 1. When β reaches a value of approximately 0.9, we enter the
chaotic region. This is characterised by inﬁnitely many solutions for each value
of β.These points correspond to strange attractors within which the exchange
rate then travels. Note that we do not obtain bifurcations in this model, like the
Hoppf bifurcation. The transition to chaos is abrupt. We do ﬁnd that increasing
the value of β can lead us in and out of the chaotic region as is shown in ﬁgure
2In appendix we do a similar analysis varying other parameters.
10Figure 3:
5.
We have produced two diagrams corresponding to two diﬀerent initial con-
ditions (ﬁgures 3 and 4). We observe that the initial conditions determine the
path that leads the model into chaos. For each diﬀerent initial condition there is
ad i ﬀerent path. In addition, it appears that the initial conditions also inﬂuence
the dynamics in a more fundamental way. This can be seen from a compari-
son of ﬁgures 3 and 4. We observe that the diﬀerent initial condition leads the
exchange rate to switch out of chaos and back into it when β is close to the
borderline between ﬁxed point solutions and chaos.
We investigated this feature further in ﬁgure 5 where we set β =0 .9 and vary
t h ei n i t i a lc o n d i t i o n s .W en o wo b s e r v et h a tt h ed i ﬀerent initial conditions lead
to switches in and out of the chaotic region. These features illustrate the great
complexity in the exchange rate dynamics. As we will be analysed in greater
detail later, this complexity has many diﬀerent implications. It acts as a veil
obscuring the transmission of exogenous shocks (e.g. shocks in the fundamental
exchange rate) into the market exchange rate. It has the potential of producing
regime switches triggered by small disturbances. Finally, this complexity greatly
complicates the making of standard statistical inferences from the distribution
of the exchange rate changes.
We also investigated the importance of transaction costs. In order to do so,
we set the transactions cost C=0, and produced similar bifurcation diagrams as
in the previous paragraphs. We show the results in ﬁgure 6. A comparison of
ﬁgure 6 with ﬁgures 3 and 4 reveals similarities and diﬀerences. The similarities




switch into chaotic solutions. In addition there is a similar dependence on initial
conditions. This is made clear from a comparison of ﬁgure 7 with ﬁgures 1 and
2.
The diﬀerences are that in the absence of transactions costs the critical
value of β that turns ﬁxed point solutions into chaos is somewhat larger. In
addition, the variability of the exchange rate is substantially smaller in the
absence of transactions costs. This is made clear both from ﬁgures 6 and 7. The
former illustrates that the variability of the exchange rate in the chaotic region
is substantially smaller in the absence of transactions costs and the latter shows
that the ﬁxed point solutions are contained within a smaller band. Finally, in
the absence of transactions costs, the path towards chaos is not characterised
by the existence of critical points with a fractal nature. Instead this path shows
many discontinuties, as is exempliﬁed by the enlargement of ﬁgure 6 in see
ﬁgure 8: On the whole there are substantial diﬀerences in the dynamics of the
exchange rates depending on whether we allow for transactions costs to play a
role. These diﬀerences will turn up again when we analyse the stochastic version
of the model
It is also important to analyse the dynamics of the weights of chartists and
fundamentalists. We ﬁn dt h a tw h e nt h ee x c h a n g er a t ec o n v e r g e st o w a r d saﬁxed-
point attractor the weights of chartists and fundamentalists converge to 0.5.
This can be explained as follows. When the exchange rates reach a ﬁxed-point
solution, chartists and fundamentalists expect no change anymore3. Therefore,
3Things are a little more complicated. When transactions costs are zero, we obain non-zero
13Figure 7:
Figure 8:
14they do not buy or sell, and thus make neither proﬁts nor losses. As a result,
the proﬁt related selection rule of the model (see equations 11 and 12) assures
that they will be equally represented in the market.
Things are very diﬀerent when the exchange rate follows a chaotic pattern. In
this case the chartists and fundamentalists weights will show cyclical movements.
In general the chartists’ weight will tend to ﬂuctuate around a value larger than
0.5 provided the chartist extrapolation is not too high. We come back to this
feature in section 8 where we analyze the dynamics of the weights of chartists
and fundamentalists in more detail.
The empirical evidence in favour of deterministic chaos is not very strong.
Sometimes deterministic chaos has been detected in the data, but most of-
ten no such dynamics has been found (D. Guillaume (1996), C. Schittenkopf,
G. Dorﬀner and E. Dockner (2001)). This suggests that we should restrict the
analysis of the model to parameter conﬁgurations that do not produce determin-
istic chaos. Typically this implies restrciting the extrapolation parameter used
by chartists not to exceed 0.9 - 1 most of the time. The borerline between ﬁxed
point solutions and chaos remains interesting, though. As we have seen, even
with an extrapolation parameter between 0.9 and 1 diﬀerent initial conditions
lead to swithches in and out of chaos, making it diﬃcult to detect deterministic
chaos from the data4.
In the next section we restrict the analysis of the model for parameter values
that do not lead to deterministic chaos. We will show that in combination with
stochastic shocks this model is capable of producing a complex dynamics that
exhibits many of the features of chaotic dynamics despite the fact that the
deterministic solutions of the model are ﬁxed points.
6 The stochastic version of the model
We now introduce stochastic disturbances to the model. In our model these
disturbances appear in two places. First they aﬀect the fundamental, which is
assumed to be a random walk. Second, as can be seen from equation (8), there
is exogenous noise leading to forecast errors of chartists and fundamentalists.
We simulate the model with a certain combination of parameter values that we
refer to as the ”standard case”. This includes setting c=5, β=0 . 5a n dθ=0 . 2 .
(Similar results are obtained for a wide range of parameter values).
A ﬁrst feature of the solution of the stochastic version of the model is the
sensitivity to initial conditions. In order to show this, we ﬁrst simulated the
model with the ”standard” parameter values and then we simulated the model
ﬁxed points. Since the fundamental exchange rate was normalised at zero, this means that the
market exchange rate is permanently diﬀerent from the fundamental rate. Thus in the steady
state the fundamentalists expect a constant appreciation (depreciation). However, because of
the risk involved, fundamentalists do not act on this. The diﬀerence between the market rate
and the fundamental rate can be considered to be a the risk premium. Our model generates
risk premia whose value depends on the initial conditions.
4Note that this switching in and out of chaos depending on the initial conditions tends to
disappear for suﬃciently high values of β.
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with the same parameters setting but with a slightly diﬀerent initial condition.
In both cases we used identical stochastic disturbances. We show the time paths
o ft h e( m a r k e t )e x c h a n g er a t ei nﬁgure 9.
We observe that after a certain number of periods the two exchange rates
start following a diﬀerent path. This result is related to the presence of many
ﬁxed-point attractors in the deterministic part of the model, which are them-
selves dependent on the initial conditions (see Figure 3,that shows how slight
diﬀerences in initial conditions can lead to ﬁxed-point attractors that are very
far apart). As a result, the two exchange rates can substantially diverge because
they are attracted by ﬁxed- points that are far away from each other. The nice
aspect of this is that we obtain a result that is typical for chaotic systems,
however, without chaos being present in the deterministic part of the model.
The combination of exogenous noise and a multiplicity of ﬁxed-point attractors
creates chaos-like dynamics.
A second feature of the model relates to the way shocks in the fundamental
exchange rate are transmitted into the market exchange rate. In linear models
a permanent shock in the fundamental has a predictable eﬀect on the exchange
rate, i.e. the coeﬃcient that measures the eﬀect of the shock in the fundamental
on the exchange rate converges after some time to a ﬁxed number. Things are
very diﬀerent in our non-linear model. We illustrate this by showing how a
permanent increase in the fundamental is transmitted to the exchange rate. We
assumed that the fundamental rate increases by 10, and we computed the eﬀect
on the exchange rate by taking the diﬀerence between the exchange rate with
the shock and the exchange rate without the shock. In a linear model we would
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ﬁnd that in the long run the exchange rate increases by 10. This is not the case
i no u rm o d e l .W ep r e s e n tt h ee v i d e n c ei nﬁgure 10 where we show the eﬀect of
t h es a m ep e r m a n e n ts h o c ko f1 0i nt h ef u ndamental rate on the exchange rate.
The simulations are done assuming exactly the same stochastics in the scenario
with as without the permanent shock in the fundamental exchange rate. Thus,
there is no exogenous noise in the model that could blur the transmission process
from the fundamental rate to the exchange rate.
The most striking feature of these results is that the eﬀect of the permanent
shock does not converge to a ﬁxed number. In fact, it follows a complex pattern.
Thus, in a non-linear world it is very diﬃcult to predict what the eﬀect will be
of a given shock in the fundamental, even in the long run. Such predictions
can only be made in a statistical sense, i.e. our model tells us that the eﬀect
of a shock of 10 in the fundamental will be to increase the exchange rate by 10
on average. In any given period, however, the eﬀect could deviate substantially
from this average prediction.
We performed a sensitivity test of this result. In order to do so, we plot the
eﬀects of the same shock in the fundamental variable against the extrapolation
parameter β. We show the result in ﬁgure 11 We also plot two lines representing
plus and minus one standard deviation of the eﬀects of the shock (the heavy
lines) . We observe that as β increases the standard deviations increases, i.e.
the precision with which one can forecast the eﬀect of a given shock in the
fundamental exchange rate declines.
The importance of the initial conditions for the eﬀect of a permanent shock
in the fundamental can also be seen by the following experiment. We simulated
the same permanent shock in the fundamental but applied it in two diﬀerent
time periods. In the ﬁrst simulation we applied the shock in the ﬁrst period;
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in the second simulation we applied it in the next period. The exogenous noise
was identical in both simulations. Thus the only diﬀerence is in the timing of
the shock. We show the results in ﬁgure 12.
We observe that the small diﬀerence in timing changes the whole future
history of the exchange rate. As a result, the eﬀect of the shock measured at a
particular point in time can be very diﬀerent in both simulations. Thus history
matters. The time at which the permanent shock occurs inﬂuences the eﬀects
of the shock.
Our results help to explain why in the real world it appears so diﬃcult to
predict the eﬀects of changes in the fundamental exchange rate on the market
rate, and why these eﬀects seem to be very diﬀerent when applied in diﬀerent
periods. In fact this is probably one of the most intriguing empirical problems.
Economists usually explain the diﬃculty of forecasting the eﬀects of a particular
change in one exogenous variable (e.g. an expansion of the money stock) by
invoking the ceteris paribus hypothesis., i.e. there are usually other exogenous
variables changing unexpectedly, preventing us to isolate the eﬀect of the ﬁrst
exogenous variable. In our model the uncertainty surrounding the eﬀect of a
disturbance in an exogenous variable is not due to the failure of the ceteris
paribus hypothesis. No other exogenous variable is allowed to change. The fact
is that the change in the exogenous variable occurs at a particular time, which
is diﬀerent from all other times. Initial conditions (history) matters to forecast
the eﬀect of shocks. Since each initial condition is unique, it becomes impossible
to forecast the eﬀect of a shock at any given point in time with any precision.
Finally, it should be stressed that the uncertainty about the eﬀect of a per-
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manent shock in the fundamental only holds in a particular environment that
is related to a low variance of the noise. In a later section we will analyse how
diﬀerent environments concerning the variance of shocks aﬀect the results.
7 Empirical relevance of the model
In this section we analyse how well our model mimics the empirical anomalies
and puzzles that have been uncovered by the ﬂourishing empirical literature.
We start with the ’disconnect puzzle’.
7.1 The disconnect puzzle
The ﬁrst and foremost empirical puzzle has been called the ”disconnect” puzzle
(see Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ(2000)), i.e. the exchange rate appears to be discon-
nected from its underlying fundamentals most of the time. It was ﬁrst analysed
by John Williamson(1985) who called it the ’misalignment problem’. This puz-
zle was also implicit in the celebrated Meese and Rogoﬀ studies of the early
1980s documenting that there is no stable relationship between exchange rate
movements and the news in the fundamental variables. Goodhart (1989) and
Goodhart and Figlioli (1991) found that most of the changes in the exchange
rates occur when there is no observable news in the fundamental economic vari-
ables. This ﬁn d i n gc o n t r a d i c t e dt h et h e o r e t i c a lm o d e l s( b a s e do nt h ee ﬃcient
market hypothesis), which imply that the exchange rate can only move when
there is news in the fundamentals.
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Our model is capable of mimicking this empirical regularity. In ﬁgure 13
w es h o wt h em a r k e te x c h a n g er a t ea n dt h ef u n d a m e n t a lr a t ef o rac o m b i n a t i o n
of parameters that does not produce deterministic chaos. (Our results hold
equally well for a large set of parameter values including those that produce
deterministic chaos).
We observe that the market rate can deviate from the fundamental value
substantially and in a persistent way. Moreover, it appears that the exchange
rate movements are often disconnected from the movements of the underlying
fundamental. In fact, they often move in opposite directions.
We show the nature of the disconnect phenomenon in a more precise way
by applying a cointegration analysis to the simulated exchange rate and its
fundamental using the same parameter values as in ﬁgure 13 for a sample of
8000 periods. We found that there is a cointegration relationship between the
exchange rate and its fundamental . Note that in our setting there is only one
fundamental variable. This implies that no bias from omitted variables can
occur.














The ﬁrst term on the right hand side is the error correction term. The result
of estimating this equation is presented in ﬁg u r e1 4w h e r ew eh a v es e tn = 4.
We ﬁnd that the error correction coeﬃcient (µ)i sv e r yl o w .T h i ss u g g e s t s
that the mean reversion towards the equilibrium exchange rate takes a very long
20Figure 14: Parameter estimates of VEC model (equation 19)
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time. In particular, only 0.5% of the adjustment takes place each period. It
should be noted that in the simulationsw eh a v ea s s u m e das p e e do fa d j u s t m e n t
in the goods market equal to 0.2. This implies that each period the adjustment
in the goods market is 20%. Thus the nominal exchange rate is considerably
slower to adjust towards its equilibrium than what is implied by the speed of
adjustment in the goods market. This slow adjustment of the nominal exchange
rate is due to the chartists’ extrapolation behaviour. This phenomenon has been
observed in reality. Chen et al.(2002) have recently discovered that most of the
slow mean reversion of the real exchange rate is due to slow adjustment of the
nominal exchange rate and not of the goods prices.
From ﬁgure 14, we also note that the changes in fundamentals have a small
and insigniﬁcant impact on the change in exchange rate. In contrast, the past
changes in the exchange rate play a signiﬁcant role in explaining the change in
exchange rate . These results are consistent with the empirical ﬁndings using
VAR approach, which suggests that the exchange rate is driven by its own past
(see De Boeck(2000))5 .
Thus, our model generates an empirical regularity (the ’disconnect’ puzzle)
that has also been observed in reality. We can summarise the features of this
puzzle as follows. First, over the very long run the exchange rate and its fun-
damentals are cointegrated. However, the speed with which the exchange rate
reverts to its equilibrium value is very slow. Second, in the short run the ex-
change rate and its fundamentals are ”disconnected”, i.e. they do not appear
to be cointegrated. Our model closely mimics these empirical regularities.
7.2 The ” excess volatility” puzzle
In this section we discuss another important empirical regularity, which has
been called the ”excess volatility” puzzle, i.e. the volatility of the exchange rate
5We also performed a cointegration analysis for shorter sample periods (1000 periods). We
ﬁnd that in some sample periods the exchange rate and its fundamental are cointegrated,
in other sample periods we do not ﬁnd cointegration. This is in line with the empirical
evidence indicating that in some periods the exchange rate seems to be disconnected from its
fundamental while in other periods it tightly follows the fundamentals .
21by far exceeds the volatility of the underlying economic variables. Baxter and
Stockman (1989) and Flood and Rose (1995) found that while the movements
from ﬁxed to ﬂexible exchange rates led to a dramatic increase in the volatility
of the exchange rate no such increase could be detected in the volatility of
the underlying economic variables. This contradicted the ’news’ models that
predicted that the volatility of the exchange rate can only increase when the
variability of the underlying fundamental variables increases ( see Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (1996) for a recent formulation of this model).
In order to deal with this puzzle we compute the noise to signal ratio in the
simulated exchange rate. We derive this noise to signal ratio as follows:
var(s)=var(f)+var(n) (20)
where var(s) is the variance of the simulated exchange rate, var(f) is the
variance of the fundamental and var(n) is the residual variance (noise) pro-
duced by the non-linear speculative dynamics which is uncorrelated with var(f).







The ratio var(n)/var(f) can be interpreted as the noise to signal ratio. It
gives a measure of how large the noise produced by the non-linear dynamics
is with respect to the exogenous volatility of the fundamental exchange rate.
We simulate this noise to signal ratio for diﬀerent values of the extrapolation
parameter beta (see ﬁgure 15). In addition, since this ratio is sensitive to the
time interval over which it is computed we checked how it changes depending on
the length of the time interval. In particular, we expect that the noise-to-signal
ratio is larger when it is computed on a short than on a long time horizon. We
show the results in ﬁgure 16.
First, we ﬁnd that with increasing β the noise to signal ratio increases. This
implies that when the chartists increase the degree with which they extrapolate
the past exchange rate movements, the noise in the exchange rate, which is
unrelated to fundamentals, increases. Thus, the signal about the fundamentals
that we can extract from the exchange rate becomes more clouded when the
chartists extrapolate more. Second, we ﬁnd that when the time horizon increases
the noise-to-signal ratio declines. This is so because over long time horizons
most of the volatility of the exchange rate is due to the fundamentals’ volatility
and very little to the endogenous noise. In contrast, over short time horizons
the endogenous volatility is predominant and the signal that comes from the
fundamentals is weak. This is consistent with the empirical ﬁnding concerning
misalignments we discussed before.
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Figure 16: C=5; beta=0.5; theta=0.2; the noise to signal ratios are averages of
20 simulations.
237.3 Fat tails
It is well known that the exchange rate changes do not follow a normal dis-
tribution. Instead it has been observed that the distribution of exchange rate
changes has more density around the mean than the normal and exhibits fatter
tails than the normal (see de Vries(2001)). This phenomenon was ﬁrst discov-
ered by Mandelbrot (1963), in commodity markets. Since then, fat tails and
excess kurtosis have been discovered in many other asset markets including the
exchange market. In particular, in the latter the returns have a kurtosis typ-
ically exceeding 3 and a measure of fat tails (Hill index) ranging between 2
and 5 (see Koedijk, Stork and de Vries (1992), Huisman, et al.(2002)). It im-
plies that most of the time the exchange rate movements are relatively small but
that occasionally periods of turbulence occur with relatively large exchange rate
changes. However, it has also been detected that the kurtosis is reduced under
time aggregation. This phenomenon has been observed for most exchange rates
(Lux(1998), Calvet and Fisher(2002)). We checked whether this is also the case
with the simulated exchange rate changes in our model.
The model was simulated using normally distributed random disturbances
(with mean = 0 and standard deviation = 1). We computed the kurtosis and
the Hill index of the simulated exchange rate returns. We computed the Hill
index for 4 diﬀerent samples of 2000 observations. In addition, we considered
three diﬀerent cut-oﬀ points of the tails (2.5%, 5%, 10%). We show the results
of the kurtosis and of the Hill index in ﬁgure 17. We ﬁnd that for a broad range
of parameter values the kurtosis exceeds 3 and the Hill index indicates the pres-
ence of fat tails. Finally we check if the kurtosis of our simulated exchange rate
returns declines under time aggregation. In order to do so, we chose diﬀerent
time aggregation periods and we computed the kurtosis of the time-aggregated
exchange rate returns. We found that the kurtosis declines under time aggre-
gation. In ﬁgure 18 we show the results for some sets of parameter values6.
This suggests that the non-linear dynamics of the model transforms normally
distributed noise in the exchange rate into exchange rate movements with tails
that are signiﬁcantly fatter than the normal distribution and with more density
around the mean. Thus our model mimics an important empirical regularity, i.e.
that exchange rate movements are characterised by tranquil periods (occurring
most of the time) and turbulent periods (occurring infrequently).
7.4 Volatility clustering
The last empirical regularity we investigate concerns the clustering of volatility.
It has been widely observed that the exchange rate returns show a GARCH
structure, i.e. there is time dependency in the volatility of the exchange rate
returns (see Kirman (2002), Lux and Marchesi (2000)). In order to check if
our model is capable of reproducing this statistical property we tested if the
simulated exchange rate returns have a GARCH structure. We ﬁrst compute the
6Another empirical regularity of the distribution of exchange returns is its symmetry. We
computed the skewness, and we could not reject that the distribution is symmetric.
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autocorrelation function of the absolute returns of the simulated exchange rate
for diﬀerent parameter values. In ﬁgure 19 we show the autocorrelation function
for a particular set of parameters. We ﬁnd that the autocorrelation parameters
die out slowly. This implies that volatility in the exchange rate returns has a long
memory.Moreover, we performed an ARCH test on the residuals of the simulated
exchange rate returns and we rejected the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.
Then, we tested for GARCH eﬀects in the exchange rate returns. In order to
do so, we chose the simplest possible GARCH speciﬁcation, i.e. GARCH (1,1)):
∆st = a +  t
σ2
t = b + α 2
t−1 + δσ2
t−1
where  t is the error term , a is a constant and σ2
t is the conditional variance
of the returns. We estimated this model using the simulated exchange rate
returns. We present the results in ﬁgure 20 for diﬀerent values of the extrap-
olation parameter β. Although the appropriate orders of lags in the GARCH
speciﬁcation could be identiﬁed by the Box-Jenkins methodology applied on the
squared residuals  2
t, we will see that our particularly simple speciﬁcation ﬁts
the empirical evidence rather well.
We observe that the GARCH coeﬃcients, α and δ,a r es i g n i ﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero implying that there is volatility clustering in the exchange rate returns.
In addition we ﬁnd that when for values of β close to one the sum of the α and
δ, which is a measure of the degree of the inertia of the volatility, is close to
one suggesting that the eﬀect of volatility shocks dies out slowly. Thus, our
model is capable of reproducing a widely observed phenomenon of clustering
and persistence in volatility.
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  coefficient z-statistic 
a  0.019 
(0.003) 
7.67 
b  0.006 
(0.0005) 
11.62 
α    0.65 
(0.03) 
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Parameter set:            C=5, beta=0.95, theta= 0.1 
  coefficient z-statistic 
a  0.019 
(0.003) 
6.95 
b  0.007 
(0.0008) 
8.68 
α    0.57 
(0.03) 
17.61 
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Parameter set:            C=3, beta=0.9, theta= 0.2 
  coefficient z-statistic 
a  0.004 
(0.003) 
1.31 
b  0.004 
(0.0005) 
8.0 
α    0.30 
(0.04)  8.5 
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Figure 20: Estimation of GARCH(1,1) on simulated returns
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8 Large and small shocks
In linear models the size of the shocks does not aﬀect the nature of the dynamics.
In non-linear models things are diﬀerent. The size of the shocks matters. This is
also the case in our exchange rate model. In order to illustrate this, we simulated
the model under two diﬀerent assumptions about the variance of the shocks in
the fundamental exchange rate. In the ﬁr s tc a s ew ea s s u m el o wv a r i a n c eo f
these shocks, in the second case we assume a high variance (ten times higher).
The results of our simulations are presented in ﬁgures 21-24. (The simulations
shown here are representative for a wide range of parameter values).
Two conclusions follow from a comparison of the low and high variance cases.
First, in the low variance case we observe sustained deviations from the equi-
librium exchange rate; this is not the case when the equilibrium exchange rate
is subject to large shocks (compare ﬁgures 21 and 23). Second, the sensitivity
to small changes in initial conditions is clearly visible when the variance of the
exchange rate is low (see ﬁgure 22). When this variance is high, no such sensi-
tivity can be observed (ﬁgure 24). It is important to stress that the transactions
cost band is the same in both cases. Thus, when the shocks are small relative to
the given band of transactions costs, the movements of the exchange rate show
more complexity than when the shocks are large.
The previous results are conﬁrmed by a cointegration analysis like the one we
performed in section 7.1 where this analysis refers to a low variance environment.
We show the results for the high variance regime in ﬁgure 25 where we contrast
the low and the high variance regimes. First the error correction coeﬃcient is




particular 23% of the adjustment is realised each period in the high variance
regime in contrast with only 0.5% in the low variance case. Second, the impact
of past changes in fundamentals is signiﬁcantly higher in the high variance than
in the low variance case7.
The intuition of this result is that when the fundamental shocks are small
the exchange rate regularly switches from the dynamics inherent within the
transactions cost band to the one prevalent outside the band. This non-linearity
produces a lot of noise and complexity in the dynamics of the exchange rate.
When the shocks are large relative to transactions cost band the dynamics
outside the band mostly prevails, leading to a tighter link between the exchange
rate and the fundamental. This feature has also been found to hold empirically.
In particular, it has been found that the PPP-relationship holds much tighter
in high inﬂation countries than in low inﬂation countries (See De Grauwe and
Grimaldi(2001)). Put diﬀerently, in high inﬂation countries the link between
the exchange rate and one of its most important fundamentals is tighter than
in low inﬂation countries.
7As in the low variance case we also performed a cointegration analysis over shorter sample
periods. The results contrast with the low variance case. For sample periods of 1000 we ﬁnd
that exchange rate and its fundamentals are cointegrated, while we do not ﬁnd cointegration
in the low variance case.
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Figure 25: Parameter estimates of VEC model (equation 19) with small and
large variance of shocks. (numbers in itlaics are t-ratios; R-square=0.11 (low
variance) ans R-square=0.18 (high variance)
9 Is chartism evolutionary stable?
An important issue is whether chartism survives in our model. Put diﬀerently,
we ask the question under which conditions chartism is proﬁtable such that it
does not disappear. It should be noted that there is a broad literature that
shows that technical analysis is used widely, also by large players (see (Taylor
and Allen (1992), Wei and Kim (1997)) .
We investigate this issue by analysing how chartism evolves under diﬀerent
conditions. In ﬁgure 26 we show the share of chartists in the market for in-
creasing values of the extrapolation parameter β. We obtained the chartists
weights by simulating the model over 10000 periods and computing the weight
of the last period. Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that chartism does not disappear, i.e.
in all simulations, for many diﬀerent parameters conﬁgurations, we ﬁnd that
the weight attached to chartists never goes to zero. Second, for a wide range
of parameter values we ﬁnd that the chartists’ weight in the market ﬂuctuates
around a market share, which exceeds 50%. Thus, in all our simulations of the
model we ﬁnd that chartist rules tend to dominate the fundamentalist rules.
(In appendix we show simulations where the weight of chartists is made to vary
with the speed of adjustment in the goods market). Third, as the extrapolation
parameter β increases the weight of chartists ﬁrst increases slightly. When β
reaches a critical point around 0.9 (which is also the point where the dynamics
switches into chaos), the market share of chartists jumps up to approximately
2/3. It then moves down to settle around 64%. This suggest that as chartists
become more aggressive in extrapolating past movements of the exchange rate,
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the chartist rule becomes more proﬁtable attracting more agents to become
chartists. Too much extrapolation in turn reduces the relative proﬁtability of
chartism and reduces its market share. The latter result suggests that when
chartists extrapolate too much the ensuing deviations from the fundamental
exchange rate makes fundamentalist forecasting rules more proﬁtable again.
The next step in the analysis consisted in doing stochastic simulations. We
simulate two regimes, a low variance and a high variance regime. These two
regimes have been deﬁned in the previous section. We show the results in ﬁgures
27 and 28. We ﬁnd that in the low variance regime the share of chartists in
the market tends to be higher than in high variance regimes. This result is very
much in line with the results discussed in the previous section. In a high variance
regime the noise to signal ratio of exchange rate movements is relatively low. As
a result, movements in the exchange rates convey more information about the
underlying fundamental, making fundamentalists rules relatively less risky and
thus increasing the weight of fundamentalists (reducing the weight of chartists).
Conversely, in a low variance regime, the noise to signal ratio is large, so that
exchange rate movements convey less information about the fundamentals. This
makes fundamentalist forecasting less precise, and thus riskier. At the same
time, the high noise content makes chartists rules relatively proﬁtable attracting
more chartists in the market.
A ﬁnal step in the analysis consisted in analysing the question of how the
proﬁts of the chartists and the fundamentalists evolve when the share of the
chartists increase exogenously. In order to answer this question we simulated
ad i ﬀerent version of the the model assuming that the shares of chartists vary
exogenously from 0 to 0.9 (instead of being determined endogenously by rela-
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33tive proﬁtability). We then computed the average proﬁts of chartists rules as
the share of the chartists increases. We did the same for the fundamentalists
proﬁts. We show the results in ﬁgures 29 and 30. The results are quite striking.
As the weight of chartists increases the proﬁts they make increases strongly. In
fact the increase becomes exponential as the share of the chartists in the market
becomes very high. Conversely, the proﬁtability of fundamentalists rules is very
high when there are few chartists in the market, but drops precipituously as the
chartists make an inroad. This suggests that there is a selﬀulﬁlling evolutionary
dynamics present in the system which can be described as follows. When there
are no chartists in the market, fundamentalist forecasting is very proﬁtable.
However, these fundamentalists proﬁts are very vulnerable to an invasion by
chartists. An invasion by 10% leads to a collapse of the fundamentalists’ proﬁts.
From a market share of 20% on, the chartists’ rule becomes more proﬁtable
than the fundamentalists’ rule. As the chartists increase in numbers, their prof-
its tend to increase exponentially. The reason is that the increasing importance
of chartists increases the noise in the exchange rate movements, making chartism
more proﬁtable. At the same time, the chartists have the eﬀect of ”creating
smoke around the fundamentals”, making fundamentalists’ forecasting riskier.
Another way to interpret this result is that chartism creates noisy information
that becomes the source of proﬁtable speculation. The more chartists there are
the more such information is created and the more proﬁtable chartists forecast-
ing becomes. Thus, chartists create an informational environment which makes
it rational to use chartists’ rules.
Why doesn’t all this not lead to a corner solution, i.e. a situation in which
chartism drives out all fundamentalists? As we have seen in the previous para-
graphs, the share of the chartists in the market is not driven to 1; it always
settles below 1. The reason has to do with risk. When the weight of chartists
increases in the market, so does volatility. We show this in ﬁgure 31 where we
present the exchange rate as a function of the weight of chartists. We observe
that an increase in the chartists weight leads to a signiﬁcant increase in volatil-
ity especially when the weight approaches 1. Thus, as the weight of chartists in
the market increases both proﬁtability and risk of using chartist rules increase.
The increasing risk is strong enough to prevents the chartists from completely
driving out the fundamentalists and taking over the market.
10 Conclusion
In this paper we use a mean variance optimisation framework to develop a simple
non linear exchange rate model with transactions costs and with heterogeneous
agents. Transactions costs produce an important non-linearity in the model.
Agents are heterogenous in that they have diﬀerent beliefs, i.e. they use two
diﬀerent forecasting rules. The ﬁrst type of agetns (the chartists) extrapolate
past exchange rate movements. They use a positive feedback rule, which tends
to destabilise the market. The second type of agents (the fundamentalists)




feedback rule, which is stabilising. The relative importance of these two types
of agents is assumed to be driven by the relative proﬁtability of their forecasting
rules and by the risk associated with the use of such rules. This simple model
is capable of creating a remarkably complex dynamics.
The model generates a multitude of ﬁxed-point attractors depending on the
initial conditions. Put diﬀerently, for each initial condition there is a unique
solution. By adding exogenous noise the model produces a complex dynam-
ics that resembles a chaotic dynamics, although the deterministic part of the
model is not chaotic. This feature has interesting implications. First, there is
sensitivity to initial conditions, which implies that a small disturbance can drive
t h ee x c h a n g er a t eo nad i ﬀerent path. Second, the eﬀect of a permanent shock
in the fundamental exchange rate has a complex structure that might even be
c h a o t i c .T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h ee ﬀect of a permanent shock in the fundamentals
is largely unpredictable, i.e. one cannot forecast how the shock will aﬀect the
exchange rate in any particular point of time, but one can predict the average
eﬀect. We also ﬁnd that the eﬀect of such a shock depends on the exact timing
of its occurrence. Thus, history matters. The market has a memory. This con-
strasts with the prevailing exchange rate models based on the eﬃcient market
and rational expectations assumptions that tend to be a-historical.
The empirical relevance of the model is a measure of its quality. Therefore,
we analyse to what extent our model is capable of reproducing the exchange rate
puzzles that we observe in reality. The ﬁr s tp u z z l ew ea n a l y s ei st h e” d i s c o n -
nect puzzle”. This puzzle relates to the fact that the exchange rate movements
are disconnected, most of the time, from the movements of the underlying fun-
36damental variables. In our model ”disconnection” is a natural outcome of the
complex dynamics produced by the interactions between agents using diﬀerent
pieces of information.
Closely related to the disconnect puzzle is the presence of excess volatility of
the exchange rate compared to the volatility of its fundamentals. This feature
has been widely documented in the empirical literature. Our model mimicks this
feature. We ﬁnd that it is connected to the number of chartists in the market,
i.e. the greater the share of chartists the larger is the noise to signal ratio in
exchange rate movements.
Third, fat tails and excess kurtosis, which have been detected in the exchange
rate returns, are generated by our model. In other words, our model produces
a complex dynamics of the exchange rate with intermittency of periods of high
and low turbulence. We ﬁnd that this alternation of periods of tranquility and
turbulence is itself unpredictible.
A fourth empirical regularity concerns the volatility clustering and persis-
tence of exchange rate returns. We ﬁnd GARCH eﬀects in the simulated ex-
change rate returns that come close to the GARCH eﬀects observed in the real
life exchange rate returns.
Fifth, the empirical evidence suggests that in environments with high vari-
ance of the fundamentals (e.g. in high inﬂation countries) the link between
exchange rate changes and its fundamentals (e.g. inﬂation rates) is tighter than
in low variance environments. We also obtain such a result in our model.This
also implies that in high variance environments predicting exchange rate changes
using fundamental information should be easier than in low variance environ-
ments.
Finally, we investigated under what conditions chartism is evolutionary sta-
ble.We found that chartism does not disappear, i.e. in all simulations for many
diﬀerent parameters conﬁgurations we ﬁnd that the number of chartists never
goes to zero. This result is consistent with the empirical evidence of the impor-
tance of chartism in foreign exchange market. We also detected a self-fullﬁlling
character of chartist proﬁtability, i.e.when more chartists enter the market they
create more noise and thereby make chartists rules more proﬁtable, inducing
more entry. Another way to interpret this result is that chartism creates noisy in-
formation that becomes the source of proﬁtable speculation. The more chartists
there are the more such information is created and the more proﬁtable chartists
forecasting becomes. Thus, chartists create an informational environment which
makes it rational to use chartists’ rules.This process is stopped, however, be-
cause of increasing risk generated by the increased noise that the same chartists
produce.
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12 APPENDIX 1: The fractal nature of the
ﬁxed point solutions
In this appendix we explore the nature of the critical points where the solution
moves from a continuous line into a fractal. Figures 32 and 33 show consecutive
enlargements of ﬁgure 3. We obtain very similar discontinuities when we enlarge
ﬁgure 5 which shows the ﬁxed points as a function of diﬀerent initial conditions.
This enlargement is shown inf ﬁgure 34. Note the similarity between these
diagrams: small changes in a parameter (beta) have the same eﬀect on the
solutions as small changes in initial conditions.
13 APPENDIX 2: Additional sensitivity analy-
sis
In this appendix we show the result of a sensitivity analysis where we allow
the speed of adjustment in the goods market to change. We construct similar
’bifurcation’ diagrams as in the main text, which show how the equilibrium
exchange rate is aﬀected by increasing speeds of adjustment in the goods market.
In ﬁgures 35 to 37 we show three such graphs for three diﬀerent values of the
chartists’ extrapolation parameter β. For low values of β, i.e. less than 0.9
( h e r ew es h o wa ne x a m p l ef o rβ =0 .8) we ﬁnd a ﬁxed point solution. As




conditions. It does not depend on the speed of adjustment in the goods market,
θ.F o rβ =0 .9,we ﬁnd that the solutions switch in an out of the chaotic region
depending on the value of θ. Finally for values of β exceeding 0.9, we obtain
chaos for all values of θ.
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